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 Is vote-buying always bad for
development?
Elections in the developing world suffer from considerable
problems such as ballot fraud, low voter education. electoral
violence, and clientelism. If developing world elections do not
revolve mainly around policy accountability, there could be
important consequences for economic development
Vote-buying seems thoroughly undemocratic. Lobby-groups
capturing the democratic process sounds suspicious enough, but
when elections are determined by whoever hands out the most
cash; well that shouldn’t happen. Moral arguments aside, vote-
buying certainly shouldn’t happen, from an economist’s point
of view at least, when there is no way to enforce the
transaction. Yet, vote-buying happens – and quite frequently in
many parts of the world too. This puzzling feature of many
elections, particularly how it affects electoral behaviour, is
something we need to understand better.
Consequences for economic development
In a world of informed voters, political economists would argue
that competition between candidates should drive the outcome
towards efficiency. Unfortunately, the real world is more
complicated. In the developing world particularly, the
democratic process has many weaknesses: competition might be
hampered by credit constraints and voters’ lower education will
likely affect the demand for information, relieving candidates of
closer scrutiny. Elections in the developing world also suffer
from other problems, from ballot fraud and electoral violence
to clientelism (notably, clientelism differs here from vote-buying
in that it involves handing out favours if an election is won, and
is usually based on longer-term relationships between the
candidate and clients which make transactions easier to
enforce). The point here is that if developing world elections
don’t revolve mainly around policy accountability, there could
be important consequences for economic development that we
seek to understand.
Wanting to know more about the effect of vote buying on
electoral behaviour, we devised a randomised field experiment
in São Tomé and Príncipe (which saw an increase in vote-
buying after oil was discovered) and we followed around a
voter education campaign. Highlighting the illegal nature of
vote-buying, and stressing that voting should be done in good
conscience even if money or gifts had been received, the
campaign distributed a leaflet and went door-to-door to discuss
it with voters. By looking at voter turnout and candidate
selection in the randomised areas where the campaign took
place, we can infer the likely effect of vote buying on electoral
21/06/2017 Is vote-buying always bad for development? - IGC
http://www.theigc.org/blog/is-vote-buying-always-bad-for-development/ 2/2
place, we can infer the likely effect of vote buying on electoral
outcomes. We also carried out direct surveys with voters to
gather their perceptions and experiences of vote-buying, as well
as their reported behaviour – a benefit being that we could
design a behavioural measure of the demand for political
accountability on corruption in the public services, and we
could also quantify whether respondents answers were affected
by any conformity bias (simply conforming to the campaign in
reporting vote-buying outcomes).
It turns out that the campaign was effective in weakening the
impact that vote-buying has on electoral outcomes.
Respondents report a decreased perception that money offered
by candidates affected voting decisions and an increase in the
perception that voting was done in good conscience. The effect
wasn’t only on perceptions: for actual voter behaviour at the
polls, increased voter education (due to the campaign) curiously
decreased voter turnout (3-6%), increased the vote share of the
incumbent and decreased the vote share of the challenger. The
campaign also led to a lower frequency of vote-buying, and at a
lower price. In addition, my behavioural measure did not pick
up any statistically significant increases in demand for political
accountability.
What can we draw from these results?
First of all, it appears that vote buying has a positive effect on
participation, and challengers employ vote buying more than
incumbents. It seems that there is an incumbency advantage at
play in the democratic process here – possibly because an
incumbent has more ability to engage in clientelism. Despite the
assumption that vote buying could only harm democracy, it
seems that in this particular case, it can actually lead to higher
competition between candidates when challengers can use it to
counter the incumbency advantage.
However, it would obviously be a step too far to say that these
results imply vote-buying should be encouraged. What we do
know from this is that voter education can work, and can be
employed to combat electoral malfeasance. Yet, vote-buying
itself is murky territory. On the one hand, it could be that vote
buying leads to worse public policies when it becomes a
substitute for public good provision. On the other hand,
though, vote buying can benefit challengers and increase
political participation. If we were simply to take these results in
isolation, we might interpret them as positive. But improved
electoral competition can only help development if there is real
policy accountability – and it is unlikely that vote-buying helps
policy accountability.
